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DOLLARS AND HORSE SENSE: WHY PRUDENT BUYERS AND
SELLERS SHOULD ACCOUNT FOR ARTICLE 2 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN THEIR EQUINE SALES
CONTRACTS
VERONICA J. FINKELSTEIN
In 1951, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute promulgated the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.). ' Since that time, the U.C.C. underwent
periodic revision, 2 and today, virtually every American jurisdiction, in
whole or in part, recognizes the U.C.C. 3 Article 2 of the U.C.C. provides
consistent, pragmatic, and effective rules governing transactions for the sale
of goods.4 As part of this scheme, the drafters developed a series of default
rules that apply when parties to a sales transaction fail to specify their own
alternative rules.5 The drafters intended the U.C.C.'s default rules to reflect
modem business realities and to apply to a variety of sales settings. 6
Although the drafters of the U.C.C. intended these default rules to be
dynamic and adaptable, challenges can arise when the U.C.C.'s default
rules are applied to specific industries.7 This is especially true when the

*Ms. Finkelstein is an Assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and an Adjunct Professor at the Earle Mack School of Law at Drexel University. This
article constitutes her personal work product and any opinions expressed herein are her personal opinion
and not the position of the Department of Justice.
L.,
GEORGETOWN
Guide,
Research
Law
Commercial
I
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/library/research/guides/commerciallaw.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2013)
2 Haider Ala Hamoudi, The American Commercial Religion, 10 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J.
107, 127-28 (2012).
Robert L. Masterson, Converting Obsolete Musical Media to Current Formats: A Copyright
Infringement Defense Arising from the Right to Repair and Implied Warranty of Fitness, 82 TEMP. L.
REv. 281, 298 (2009) (noting that Article 2 of the U.C.C. has not only been adopted in every state
except Louisiana but that Article 2 has also been adopted in the District of Columbia and the Virgin
Islands).
4 Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code 1949-1954,
49 BUFF. L. REv. 359, 371 (2001).
s Id. at 475.
6 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed
"Property", 69 TEMP. L. REv. 1281, 1293 (1996); Michael D. Sousa, Lien on Me: The Jurisprudential
Underpinnings of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Reflection of the Realist Theorists, 26 Am. BANKR.
INST. J. 44, 87 (2007).
Emmie West, Construction Contracting: Building Better Law with the Uniform
Commercial Code, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2007) (noting the challenges inherent in
applying the U.C.C. to the construction industry).
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default rules are applied to an industry with its own norms, which may
conflict with the U.C.C.'s default rules.
Indeed, the equine industry has a rich culture and tradition that
includes a variety of unique circumstances in sales transactions. 8 As a
whole, the equine industry is not homogeneous. Buyers and sellers in the
equine industry are highly divergent. Age demographics range from
children on ponies,9 to high-profile investors on six-figure, dressage
horses,'o to multi-million-dollar racehorse syndicators." Certain norms may
apply uniformly across the broad equestrian community while others apply
only to a sub-community of equestrians. Despite the divergence of
equestrians and the existence of industry-specific norms, courts have
generally concluded that the default rules in Article 2 of the U.C.C. apply to
horse sales.12 Application of these default rules are critical because these
rules provide warranty remedies separate and distinct from those provided
under contract law.13 In certain circumstances, these warranty remedies
provide recovery where no contract remedy exists. 14
Notwithstanding the importance of understanding the interplay
between the U.C.C. and general principles of contract law, many parties
buying and selling horses are uneducated about the U.C.C. Buyers and
sellers routinely fail to account for the application of the U.C.C.'s default
rules when drafting equine sale contracts. Even equine attorneys may focus
on contractual remedies and overlook state consumer protection and U.C.C.

8 Joan S. Howland, Let's Not "Spit the Bit" in Defense of "The Law of the Horse": The
Historical and Legal Development of American Thoroughbred Racing, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 473
(2004) (arguing there is law unique to the equine industry and providing historical background to frame
these norms).
9 Anne 1. Bandes, Saddled with a Lame Horse? Why State Consumer Protection Laws Can
Be the Best Protection for Duped Horse Purchasers, 44 B.C. L. REv. 789, 789-90 (2003).
1oJan Ebeling, Road to the Olympics: Jan Ebeling, Part 3, CHRON. HORSE (June 28, 2012),
http://www.chronofhorse.com/article/road-olympics-jan-ebeling-part-3?page=2 (stating that the horse
Rafalca was owned by Anne Romney, wife of then presidential candidate Mitt Romney).
" Howland, supra note 8, at 506; Ben Wright, Horse Trading: Racehorse Syndicates Gain in
Popularity,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Sept.
19,
2010,
4:49
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704206804575467113342171690.html
(noting that
racing syndicates can be a multi-million dollar commodity).
2
1 See, e.g., Cohen v. North Ridge Farms, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1265, 1269 (E.D. Ky. 1989)
(referencing adispute over a thoroughbred horse purchased at the Keeneland auction); Sessa v. Riegle,
427 F. Supp. 760, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (referencing a breach of warranty case for sale of a standard bred
horse); Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (referencing a revocation of
acceptance for purchase of thoroughbred broodmare); Rowland v. Scarborough Farms, LLC, 648 S.E.2d
151, 152 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (referencing a breach of contract arising from an oral agreement for the
sale of a colt); Claxton v. Boothe, 790 P.2d 1201, 1202 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (referencing an action for
rescission where seller could not produce registration papers for Arabian horses); Keller v. Merrick, 955
P.2d 876, 879 (Wyo. 1998) (referencing a breach of warranty claim following injury caused by horse
sold by dealer).
13See Cohen, 712 F. Supp. at 1269 (noting that "where an express provision of the UCC
addresses an issue, the express Code provision controls rather than legal and equitable principles.").
14Id.
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remedies. To complicate matters further, courts apply numerous U.C.C.
default rules and definitions when interpreting equine sales contracts. These
default rules and definitions often conflict with equine industry norms in
ways that can affect the outcome of a dispute. 5 Prudent buyers and sellers
should, therefore, consider and expressly account for these distinctions
when entering an equine sales contract.
I. THE U.C.C.'s DEFINITION OF A MERCHANT SELLER MAY NOT
PRECISELY DOVETAIL WITH THE PARTIES' UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE BARGAINING POSITIONS

As previously noted, the parties to equine sale transactions are
highly varied. Many of the U.C.C.'s default rules utilize the concept of a
merchant seller. Section 2-104 defines a merchant as:
[A] person that deals in goods of the kind or otherwise
holds itself out by occupation as having knowledge or skill
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the
transaction or to which the knowledge or skill may be
attributed by the person's employment of an agent or
broker or other intermediary that holds itself out by
occupation as having the knowledge or skill.16
Pursuant to this definition, a seller is a merchant if he or she meets one of
the following three definitions: (1) he or she a professional in the equine
industry; (2) he or she, by occupation, holds himself or herself out as
having specialized equine knowledge; or (3) he or she employs a
professional equine sales agent.17 In straightforward cases, courts have little
difficulty determining that a seller is a merchant.'" These straightforward
cases typically involve the first category of merchants-equine
professionals.' 9 A seller whose sole profession is to buy, race, and sell
racehorses is a merchant.2 0 A seller whose occupation is the management of
a hunter-jumper "sale barn" where horses are taken on consignment,

" See, e.g., Kazmaier v. Connelly, 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 233, 233 (1994) (emphasizing
defendant's position as an "amateur" in determining how to apply the UCC, despite amateur having a
different meaning in the context of dressage).
6 U.C.C. § 2-104.
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., Calloway v. Manion, 572 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that a seller
who was a "a professional horse dealer" was a merchant with respect to horse sales).
19 Id.

20 See, e.g., Id.; Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (holding
that a seller
who owned and raced standard bred horses was unquestionably a merchant).
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trained, and re-sold is a merchant. 2 1 A seller who breeds Arabian horses for
a living is a merchant.22 A seller who has sold over a hundred horses
throughout his lifetime is a merchant.23 Similarly, courts have little trouble
applying the third category, determining that a professional equine sales
agent is a merchant seller.24
With respect to application of the first and third definitions of a
merchant, the equine industry does not pose any unique challenges.
Difficulty arises when courts attempt to apply the second definition. This
definition has two key elements: (1) a seller must have specialized
knowledge and skill; and, (2) that skill must be as a result of the seller's
employment.25 Meeting this definition of a merchant is where the U.C.C.
sometimes fails to adequately apply to the equine industry. In the equine
industry, unlike many others, sellers may have in-depth knowledge and
experience but may be employed in an unrelated field.2 6 For many sellers,
riding and owning horses is a hobby rather than a profession. 27 For
example, a seller buying and selling horses her entire life may
contemporaneously work for a living in a wholly unrelated field such as
law, medicine, or engineering.2 8 In the equine industry, experience and
employment do not always go hand-in-hand.
How the equine industry defines a professional versus an amateur
rider for the purposes of competition also perplexes the courts. 2 9 Since
1917, the United States Equestrian Federation (U.S.E.F.) and its

21 See Nelson v. Heuckeroth, No. 74 Civ. 2354-CSH, 1978 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14996, at *3536 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1978) (finding a breach of implied warranties, and therefore that the seller was a
merchant, where the seller was in the regular business of buying and reselling horses in the
hunter/jumper industry).
22 See Alpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406, 1415-16 (D. Vt. 1986) (classifying an Arabian
horse seller as a merchant where the seller dealt in Arabian purebred horses, had specialized knowledge
of the Arabian horse business, and employed agents having similarly specialized knowledge); see also
Nelson, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14996, at *35-36 (holding that a seller who showed and trained horses
was a merchant with respect to horse sales).
23 Randazzo v. McCarthy, No. CV040083688S, 2005 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 2284, at *5-6
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2005) (holding a person that sells a hundred horses qualifies as a merchant).
24 See, e.g., Travis v. Wash. Horse Breeders Ass'n, 759 P.2d 418, 420-21 (Wash. 1988)
(holding that an equine auctioneer is a merchant).
25 U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2011).
26 See generally Blackwell v. Comm'r of Int'l Revenue, 102 T.C.M.
(CCH) 137 (2011)
(indicating that petitioner was an experienced horse breeder, but was employed as a rehabilitation nurse
counselor).
27 See, e.g., Keating v. Comm'r, 544 F.3d 900, 901-02 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding petitioner's
horse breeding activity a hobby rather than a profession).
28 Cf id. (discussing how petitioners'
years of horse breeding coincided with their
employment in the medical field).
29 See generally Kazmaier v. Connelly, No. 917494, 1994 WL 879527, at *1 (Mass. Super.
Ct. June 8, 1994) (attempting to determine whether a horse qualified as a "consumer good" as defined
by the Uniform Commercial Code). As part of its reasoning, the Court focused on whether the horse was
purchased by a farm for business purposes as opposed to whether the horse was purchased for "amateur
dressage competition." Id.
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predecessor organization have governed equestrian competition in the
United States. 30 The U.S.E.F. promulgates rules, which, among other
things, define individuals as either amateurs or professionals for
competition purposes. 3 ' There are incentives for riders to maintain their
amateur status for purposes of competition.32 Many sellers have years of
experience with horses, yet choose to maintain amateur status.33 A seller
may have spent twenty years as a professional horse seller, but then,
provided she follows the necessary rules, may later regain amateur status.
As defined by the U.S.E.F., amateur status is not correlated with
experience. Pursuant to U.S.E.F. General Rules 1306 and 1307, a person is
presumptively an amateur unless that person engages in a specific list of
behavior defined by the rules as being the conduct of professionals,
regardless of that person's equestrian skills and accomplishments.
Notably, a rider who buys and sells his or her own horses, even if on a
significant scale, is not a professional. Therefore, a seller may have years of
experience with horse sales, and in fact, may have knowledge in the area
that exceeds the knowledge of many equine professionals. Regardless, this
seller may be classified by the U.S.E.F. as an amateur. In short, an amateur
for competition purposes may have significant experience with horse sales,
while a professional for competition purposes may have none.
Accordingly, the U.S.E.F.'s definition of a professional is not
consistent with the U.C.C.'s definition of a merchant. The U.C.C.'s
definition of a merchant does not easily fit the reality of the equine industry,
and the industry's own definitions may prove misleading to a court that is
not well-versed in the U.S.E.F. rules. A seller with U.S.E.F. amateur status,
employment in a non-equine field, and deep experience in selling his or her
own horses poses a quandary for a court tasked with determining whether
this seller is a merchant. On one hand, the U.S.E.F. expressly labels this
seller as a non-professional. Yet, for all practical purposes, this seller may
possess the very skills, knowledge, and experience that prompted the

30 See generally Jes Props. v. USA Equestrian, Inc., 458 F.3d
1224 (1lth Cir. 2006)
(discussing the history and application of U.S.E.F. rules in the context of antitrust litigation relating to
the U.S.E.F. mileage rule which prevents multiple sanctioned competition from being simultaneously
held within the same geographic area); see also Jacob L Kahn, From Borden to Billing: Identifying a
Uniform Approach to Implied Antitrust Immunity from the Supreme Court's Precedents, 83 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1439, 1465 (2008) (noting the U.S.E.F.'s "monolithic control" over equestrian sports).

31 U.S. EQUESTRIAN FED'N, 2013
26-29

PARTICIPANTS

RULE BOOK: GENERAL RULES FOR COMPETITION
(2012),
available
at

http://www.usef.org/documents/ruleBook/2013/GeneralRules/13-CompetitionParticipants.pdf.
32

See, e.g., U.S. EQUESTRIAN FED'N, 2013 RULE BOOK: JUMPER DIVISION

13 (2013),

available at http://www.useforg/documents/ruleBook/2013/18-JP.pdf (designating amateurs are entitled
to show in restricted classes where they need not compete against professionals).
33Cf id (indicating that some competitors, though experienced, may prefer to compete in
restricted classes).
34U.S. EQUESTRIAN FED'N, supranote 31, at 26-31.

186

KY. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L.

[Vol. 5 No. 2

U.C.C. drafters to create higher merchant-seller standards. The buyer may
in fact assume, based on the seller's expertise, they are indeed a merchant
seller. The U.C.C.'s definition, which requires both equine experience and
employment in the equine industry, may lead a court to conclude even the
most experienced seller is not a merchant simply because they compete as
an amateur.
Complicating the problem, a seller may have deep experience in
one equestrian sub-community but no experience in another area. 3
Generally, to be deemed a merchant for U.C.C. purposes, a seller must have
experience in the particular type of sale at issue.36 Courts found it difficult
to determine whether experience with the animal sales for one purpose
renders a seller a merchant when those same animals are sold for a different
purpose.3 7 Under the U.C.C. definition, it remains unclear whether a seller
who competes in reining would be considered a merchant when they sell a
young horse as a showjumping prospect rather than as a reining prospect.
As a result, an equine transaction need not be between two
inexperienced participants for a court to find the transaction does not
involve a merchant seller. Even a very experienced equestrian may be
deemed a non-merchant if their employment field is unrelated or even if
their equine experience is limited to a particular subset of the equine
industry. Buyers should not automatically expect a seller to be deemed a
merchant, even if the seller's equine experience is significant. A wise buyer
should demand that a seller expressly state in the equine sales contract that
the seller is a merchant as defined by the U.C.C. Conversely, where a seller
is truly not a merchant, that seller may wish to state so in the sales contract
to avoid later confusion.

AUSTL.,
is
Reining?,
EQUESTRIAN
3
Compare
What
http://www.equestrian.org.aul?Page=25622&MenulD=Sports%2FI 1757%2F0%2CReining%2F 11740%
2F37 (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) ("Reining is a Western riding discipline where a rider guides a horse
through a pre-determined pattern of circles, spins, and stops."), with Katherine Blocksdorf, What are the
ABOUT.COM,
Sports?,
Equestrian
Olympic
(last visited Jan. 27, 2013)
http://horses.about.com/od/horsesportsexplainedla/whatisolysequis.htm
("Show jumping tests the ability of horse and rider to jump over a series of obstacles inside a riding
ring.").
36 See, e.g., Sand Seed Service, Inc. v. Poeckes, 249 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 1977) (holding
that a farmer who grew and sold his own crops was not a merchant seller because his professional
experience was in farming rather than in sales).
3 See Fear Ranches, Inc. v. Berry, 470 F.2d 905, 907-08 (10th Cir. 1972) (remanding for a
determination of whether a seller farmer who usually sold cattle for slaughter was a merchant seller
when his cattle were instead sold for breeding purposes).
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II. THE U.C.C.'S IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY MAY NOT BE
APPLIED INA MANNER THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH EQUINE INDUSTRY
EXPECTATIONS
The determination of whether a seller is a merchant is critical
because the U.C.C.'s implied warranty of merchantability set forth in
Section 2-314 only applies where the seller is a merchant.38 The implied
warranty of merchantability provides that "[u]nless excluded or modified. .
. a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."3
Section 2-314 also defines specific minimum standards of merchantability,
including the goods be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods
are used." 40 The U.C.C.'s implied warranty of merchantability arises by
operation of law and acts as a form of strict liability,41 providing the buyer a
powerful remedy. If the warranty applies, the buyer is entitled to a horse fit
for ordinary use, regardless of any representation by the seller.
This definition of fitness presents unique challenges in the realm of
equine sales because determining the ordinary use of a horse can prove
difficult, especially when asking whether a particular horse is fit for a
specific use. Certainly, one basic quality of a merchantable horse suitable
for ordinary use is physical soundness. A horse that is sound is understood
to be free from serious physical maladies.4 2 The U.C.C. and its predecessor,
the Uniform Sales Act, deem horses unfit for ordinary purposes due to
serious physical maladies such as blindness, 43 deafness," significant limb
deformity, 45 Soft tissue injury, 46 lameness, 47 gait irregularity, 48 degenerative
3 John Alan Cohan, Agriculture Law Symposium: The Uniform Commercial Code as
Applied to Implied Warranties of "Merchantability" and "Fitness" in the Sale of Horses, 73 KY. L.J.
665, 667 (1984).
3
U.C.C. § 2-314(l) (2011).
40 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (2011).
41Cohan, supra note 38, at 673; see also Overstreet v. Norden Labs., Inc., 669 F.2d 1286,
1289 (6th Cir. 1982) ("The implied warranty of merchantability arises by operation of law.").
42 See Kenner v. Harding, 85 Ill. 264, 269 (Ill. 1877) (citations omitted) (intemal quotation
marks omitted) ("[A] horse warranted sound, must be taken as buying him for immediate use, and has a
right to expect one capable of that use, and of being immediately put to any fair work the owner
chooses."); cf O'Connell v. Kennedy, 101 N.E. 2d 892, 894-95 (Mass. 1951) (citations omitted)
(intemal quotation marks omitted) (indicating a horse is "unsound" if it has any disease that diminishes
the "natural usefulness of the animal").
43Brown v. Jones, 24 Ala. 463, 465 (Ala. 1854); Bartholomew v. Bushnell, 20 Conn. 271,
271 (Conn. 1850); Randazzo v. McCarthy, No. CV040083688S, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2284, at *56 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005); Shannon v. Abel, 155 S.W. 62, 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913).
4 Hoffman v. Oates, 77 Ga. 701, 705 (Ga. 1886).
45Kenner v. Harding, 85 Ill. 264, 269 (Ill. 1877); Bank of Bushnell v. Buck Bros., 142 N.W.
1004, 1006 (Iowa 1913); Fulwiler Elec. Co. v. Jinks McGee & Co., 211 S.W. 480, 480-81 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1919).
46Hull v. Dannen, 157 N.W. 188, 189 (Iowa 1916).
4 Nelson v. Heuckeroth, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14996, at *47 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1978); Leal
v. Holtvogt, 123 Ohio App. 3d 51, 68-69 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
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disease, 49 and breathing dysfunction.50 Clearly, pursuant to the U.C.C., a
physically unsound horse is unfit for ordinary purpose. For example, in
Nelson v. Heuckeroth, the trial court readily concluded a horse that
underwent a surgical procedure known as a neurectomy 5 l to deaden the
nerves in his hoof and mask a degenerative condition causing lameness,
was not fit for ordinary purposes, including riding. 52 Even with the absence
of evidence the seller was aware of the horse's prior neurectomy, the court
concluded that the merchant seller was liable for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability.5 3 In a form of strict liability, the merchant
seller owed the buyer a sound horse, and the court concluded a horse with
that type of surgical intervention unsound for the ordinary use of riding.5 4
Courts are willing to expand the definition of soundness when
applying the implied warranty of merchantability. In the case of a horse
intended for breeding rather than riding, courts conclude the implied
warranty of merchantability extends beyond physical soundness to cover
fertility as well. For example, the court in Alpert v. Thomas concluded
where a merchant seller was involved, the implied warranty of
merchantability for a breeding stallion assured the buyer that the purchased
stallion was capable of impregnating a mare. In this context, the implied
warranty of merchantability extended to cover the horse's breeding
soundness in addition to the horse's physical condition. Logically, the
intended purpose of a breeding stallion is breeding, so soundness includes a
component of fertility.
In contexts straying further from physical soundness, courts are
more reluctant to extend the implied warranty of merchantability. The
application of the implied warranty of merchantability becomes especially
difficult when the seller asserts a horse is unfit because of a behavioral or
performance problem. Some courts refuse to extend the warranty to cover
such problems. For example, in O'Connor v. Judith B. & Roger C. Young,
Inc., the court expressly held the implied warranty of merchantability
applies only to physical conditions. The merchant seller in O'Connor sold
"Big Foot" and represented the horse was suitable for the buyer's daughter

' Overbeck v. Hayes, 1993 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 635, at *21-22 (Mont. Dist. Ct. 1993).
4 Putt v. Duncan, 2 Ill. App. 461, 463 (Ill. 1877).
so Commonwealth v. Watson, 142 S.W. 200, 201 (Ky. 1912); Siegel v. Riebolt, 125 N.W.
582, 582 (Minn. 1910); Overhulser v. Peacock, 128 S.W. 526, 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910); Roberts v.
Jenkins, 21 N.H. 116, 119 (1850); Clearwater v. Forrest, 72 Ore. 312, 316 (1914).
51See Mires v. Evans, No. 82-4436, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22524, at *11-12 (E.D. Pa. July
21, 1986).
52Nelson, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14996, at *43-44.
5 Id. at *44.
54 Id.

5sAlpert v. Thomas, 643 F. Supp. 1406, 1415 (D. Vt. 1986).
56O'Connor v. Judith B. & Roger C. Young Inc., No. C-93-4547, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21111, at *Il (N. D. Cal. June 30, 1995).
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to ride in jumping competitions.57 A few weeks after receiving the horse,
the buyer reported Big Foot was "behaving erratically and refusing
fences."5 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the seller,
noting Big Foot's behavior did not render the horse unfit for ordinary
59
purposes.
This outcome may seem utterly at odds with the holding in Nelson.
Just as the horse in Nelson was rendered incapable of competition due to
physical limitation,60 the horse in O'Connor was rendered incapable of
competition due to behavioral limitation.66 Neither horse seems fit for
ordinary riding purposes. The different outcome in these two cases may
derive from the reluctance to acknowledge a major difference between
horses and other goods in O'Connor: horses as living, animate objects. In
this way, horses and other animals are radically different from most
consumer goods.
The court's conclusion in O'Connor may surprise the average
equine buyer. It behooves a wise buyer to realize a court called upon to
interpret an equine sales contract may not have in-depth equine knowledge.
Any person familiar with showjumping recognizes a horse behaving
erratically will be all but impossible to use for ordinary riding and showing
purposes, but such a conclusion may not be evident to a judge tasked with
finding the four corners of a contract. As such, buyers intending to use a
horse for a specific purpose are well advised to request, in writing, specific
representations of the horse's ability and willingness to perform.62 The sales
contract should address not only physical performance, but also behavioral
performance. Then the buyer will not be limited to an implied warranty
claim, which may fail in the absence of evidence of physical unsoundness.
III. THE U.C.C.'S EXPRESS WARRANTY DEFAULT RULES MAY RESULT IN
PARTIES BEING HELD TO REPRESENTATIONS THEY DID NOT ANTICIPATE
WOULD BE LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE

In addition to the implied warranty of merchantability and other
implied warranties, a seller may also be bound to express warranties if that
seller makes an affirmative statement relating to the quality, condition,
description, or performance potential of the horse.63 Pursuant to U.C.C.
3

Id. at *1-3.
* Id. at *4.
5
Id. at *I 1-13.
60 Nelson v. Heuckeroth, No. 74 Civ. 2354-CSH, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14996, at *44
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1978).
61
See O'Connor,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21111, at *14.
62 E.g., Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F.Supp. 760, 765 (E.D.Pa. 1977) (holding that a statement by the
seller during a telephone conversation that a horse was sound was not an express warranty).
63 Adam Epstein, Sales and Sports Law, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 67,
76 (2008).
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Section 2-313, any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer relating to the goods becomes a part of the basis of the bargain and
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation
or promise.64 Sellers, making representations regarding a sale horse's age,
pedigree, past performance, or condition, have been sued under a breach of
express warranty theory. 5 In the case of straightforward representations,
such as pedigree or breed registration status, the express warranty may be
easy to enforce.66
In express warranty cases relating to a horse's quality, these
warranties become difficult to enforce. A horse is not fungible; each horse
is unique unlike other mass-produced goods. Riders, and their quality
assessments, are also unique. What one rider might consider an ideal equine
trait might be a flaw, or vice, for another rider. For example, a horse with a
propensity to gallop quickly might be a valuable racehorse, but an
unsuitable western pleasure mount.6 7 A horse with a breathing problem
causing it to make an audible sound may be deemed valueless as a show
hunter but may serve as an appropriate field hunt mount. 68 Beauty is in the
eye of the rider. Despite this fact, sellers regularly make quality
representations as though such representations are not subjective. 69 Despite
obvious limitations on the ability to truly describe a horse's quality, it is
very common in the equine industry for sellers to make representations
regarding quality as part of a sale transaction. Even a cursory scan of horse
sale advertisements reveals sellers routinely use words like "bombproof' to
induce buyers to purchase. 70 These terms are used frequently to suggest
that they are uniformly understood. These representations are critical
because they may become part of the parties' bargain. Quality statements
may be considered to constitute express warranties when they go beyond

' U.C.C. § 2-313 (2011).
65 See, e.g., Morningstar v. Hallett, 858 A.2d 125, 131 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2004).
66 See, e.g., Yost v. Millhouse, 373 N.W.2d 826, 828-830
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that an express warranty had been breached when a seller represented that a horse was registered with
the American Quarter Horse Association when, in fact, the horse was unregistered).
67
Western
Pleasure,
BEGINNING
HORSEMANSHIP,
http://www.beginninghorsemanship.com/?pageid=213 (last visited Mar. 16, 2013) ("Western Pleasure
is a western competition that judges horses on their manners, the horse having a relaxed soft collected
gait and being calm and responsive and responding with little rein contact. . . . Horses that are calm,
have smooth collected soft gaits and have nice musculature that can handle the slow, controlled
movements are the most competitive.").
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112, 114
(2d Cir. 1968) (indicating
that where an express warranty was created when the auctioneer stated that the horse was "as sound- as,
as gutty a horse as you want to find anywhere. He'll race a good mile for you every time. He's got loads
of heart and you're way off on the price of this horse.").
7o Dictionary of Horse Terms, HORSES & HORSE INFO., http://www.horses-and-horseinformation.com/horsedictionary.shtml#b (last visited Mar. 16, 2013) (defining a bombproof horse as
one that will not spook).
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mere puffery. 7' Determining whether a statement constitutes an express
warranty or mere puffery is a question of fact, and the decision may vary
widely based on the circumstances.72
Ultimately, courts are willing to find a seller's horse-quality
representation constitutes an express warranty. For example, in Key v.
Bagen, the court held a buyer could proceed on a breach of warranty theory
where a horse was represented as "well behaved," "safe," and "suitable [on
which] to learn equitation." 3 Similarly, in O'Shea v. Hatch, the court found
a breach of express warranty where the seller represented the horse as a
gentle gelding suitable for use by children, but the horse was later
discovered to be a ridgling after it exhibited dangerous behavior.7 4 In both
cases, the courts concluded the quality statements made by the seller
became part of the bargain and could form a basis for recovery by the buyer
if the horse was not as represented.75 In other words, the buyers in Key and
O'Shea were entitled to rely on the representations made about the safety of
the purchased horses because these statements were not mere puffery and
were part of the parties' bargain.7 6
A buyer should not be lulled into a false sense of security by Key
and O'Shea because courts in similar contexts are less willing to find
express warranties. In a seemingly similar case, the court in Schmitt v. Salit
held that a statement that a horse was a "good kid's horse" constituted an
express warranty but found no breach of that warranty when the horse later
displayed difficulty cantering.77 In so concluding, the court reasoned that a
"good kid's horse" was a safe horse but not necessarily a safe show horse.
In other words, without an express statement as to the horse's ability to
show, the seller's representation could not be interpreted to extend to a
warranty for a show-worthy horse. A comparison of the Key, O'Shea, and
Schmitt decisions reveals how fact-sensitive breach-of-express-warranty
cases are. In each case, the seller made a representation regarding the
horse's suitability for a child rider.7 9 Although the representations were
similar, the buyer in Schmitt asserted the horse was unsuitable but in a

71La Trace v. Webster, 17 So.3d 1210, 1217 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008); Arlandson v. Hartz Mt.
Corp., 792 F. Supp. 2d 691, 706 (D.N.J. 2011).
72 Snyder v. Farnam Cos., Inc., 792 F.Supp.2d 712,
721-722 (D.N.J. 2011).
7 Key v. Bagen, 221 S.E.2d 234, 235-36 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); see also Yuzwak v. Dygert,
144 A.D.2d 938, 939-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (permitting a warranty case to proceed to trial where a
seller represented a horse to be "quiet" and a "fine show horse for children" reasoning that these
representations could be construed by the fact-finder to constitute express warranties).
74 O'Shea v. Hatch, 640 P.2d 515, 518 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).
sKey, 221 S.E.2d at 235; O'Shea, 640 P.2d at 518.
76 Key, 221 S.E.2d at 235; O Shea, 640 P.2d at 518.
7 Schmitt v. Salit, CA85-10-069, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7824, at *3-4 (Aug. 11, 1986).
* Id. at *4.
* Key, 221 S.E.2d at 235; O'Shea, 640 P.2d at 518; Schmitt, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7824, at
*4.
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manner slightly different than the seller had represented." The Schmitt
court refused to liberally interpret the warranty in order to apply to the
seller's representation.'
Even more troubling, a court may decide a seller should be held to
her intended representation rather than her express representation. For
example, the buyer in Simpson v. Widger learned the seller's express
warranty actually meant something different than was stated.82 In Simpson,
the seller represented "Mighty Quinn" was a sound horse.83 At the time of
representation, the seller knew the horse had been diagnosed with ringbone,
a condition dramatically reducing the horse's long-term prognosis for
soundness.84 The buyer sued for breach of warranty but the court found for
the seller reasoning the seller's warranty was actually a warranty for the
horse's "serviceable soundness," not actual soundness. 85 The court in
Simpson noted the concept of soundness is a complex one, and a horse
could be presently sound while having radiographic changes suggesting
future unsoundness. 86 The court concluded the seller's soundness
representation was actually a representation that the horse was capable of
doing the job at the time of the sale.87
Departing from the aforementioned express warranty cases, the
court in Sheffield v. Darby held a seller's statement asserting a horse had no
problems and "would make a good show horse" were not express
warranties but instead were mere puffery on which the buyer had no basis
to rely. 88 The court issued its holding despite a cursory pre-purchase
examination that revealed straight pasterns, short movement, and that the
horse was shod in corrective shoes. 89 The court, in its reasoning, likened the
horse to a car:
Statements that a horse has no problems and would make a
good show horse are very similar to the following
statements that have been held unactionable [sic] as mere
opinions, commendations, or puffing: defendant had the
experience and qualifications to run a paint and body shop;
a building was maintained in good condition and was
80 Schmitt,

1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7824, at *34.

8 Id.
82

at *4.

89 Id

at 778-79.

Simpson v. Widger, 709 A.2d 1366, 1371 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
" Id.at 1370-71.
m Id at 1373.
8s Id at 1371; see also, Norton v. Lindsay, 350 F.2d 46, 48-49 (10th Cir. 1965) (finding that
"sound" implies "the absence of any defect or disease which... will impair the animal's natural
usefulness for the purpose for which it is purchased).
86 Simpson, 709 A.2d at 1371-72.
87 Id.
88 Sheffield v. Darby, 535 S.E.2d 776, 779 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000).
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suitable for use as a chiropractic clinic; a car was "bugfree"; a building was sound, of excellent construction, and
well maintained; farm machinery was in good condition
and would satisfactorily pick cotton; a car was in "A-1
condition"; and a car was in good condition and suitable for
driving.90
The court further likened a veterinary pre-purchase exam to a structural
engineering examination of a building, noting failure to require a
comprehensive examination precluded reliance on any of the seller's
statements. 9 ' Even more troubling, the court conceded the buyers presented
sworn statements that a previous owner told the sellers the horse was
unsound to show and, in fact, had significant latent lameness.92 In Sessa v.
Riegle, the court held a soundness representation did not constitute a
warranty since horses are "fragile creatures" likely to fall prey to illness and
disease.93
The Sheffield and Sessa decisions highlight the difficulties courts
face when applying U.C.C. rules on express warranties in the context of
equine sales. Unlike a car, which in most cases is a fungible good identical
to thousands of other cars that are the same make, model, and year, a horse
is unique, living, and ever evolving. Horses are far less static than cars. As
any horse owner would attest, a horse can be sound one minute and lame
the next - often with nary an explanation. A mechanic can often
conclusively determine if a car is in functional, working-condition, and will
continue to function for a predictable period of time. A structural engineer
can likely predict a building's structural integrity not only on the day of
examination, but also into the future, barring unexpected circumstances. A
veterinarian, on the other hand, can only attest to a horse's physical
presentation for the day of the veterinary examination. Whether the horse
will make a suitable show horse, or whether his condition will allow him to
remain sound for a specific use, is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to
predict.
Complicating this issue is the fact that not all equine defects are
easily diagnosed, though some are easily detected. If a horse has a fractured
bone, the fracture should be visible on radiograph.94 Other physical defects
may be latent. A soft tissue injury, for example, may be present even if it

90

Id. at 779.

91 Id.
92Id at 778.
9 Sessa v. Riegle,

427 F.Supp. 760, 766 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
Robert S. Miller, The Sale of Horses and Horse Interests: A Transactional Approach, 78
KY. L.J. 517, 570-71 (1990).
9
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cannot be visualized by ultrasound. 95 Physical conditions may go
undiagnosed for years, and it may be impossible to definitively determine
whether those conditions were present at the time of sale. Even more
difficult to assess are behavioral qualities and personality. A horse may
appear quiet and biddable during a trial ride at the seller's barn, but may
turn into an entirely different behaving animal when transported to the
buyer's barn or to a show. A horse that performs well for a tactful,
experienced rider may begin to rear and buck when ridden by a rough or
inexperienced rider. A horse's ability to perform or overall quality may not
be readily discoverable.96
As Sheffield and Sessa illustrate, if a quality representation is
important to the buyer, the buyer should seek a specific warranty of quality
from the seller. If the seller makes a general representation, a wise buyer
will probe the parameters of the representation, confirm it is not mere
puffery, ensure the specific representation becomes incorporated into the
written sales contract, and identify the express warranty on which the buyer
can rely. A prudent seller will seriously consider whether statements made
about a sale horse can be verified. The wise seller clarifies in the written
sales contract that specific representations, including those made in any sale
advertisements, are not intended to constitute warranties of quality.
IV. THOSE IN THE EQUINE INDUSTRY FACE UNIQUE CHALLENGES IN
COMPLYING WITH THE U.C.C.'s NOTICE REQUIREMENTS

If a buyer believes a horse has been misrepresented, the buyer has
two alternate forms of relief under the U.C.C. The buyer may attempt to
rescind his purchase by rejecting the horse or revoking acceptance of the
horse, 97 or the buyer may sue for damages based on breach of warranty. 98
Even assuming a warranty action may lie, an additional complication in
meeting the U.C.C.'s notice requirements arises in the equine industry.
Under the U.C.C., a buyer must provide the seller with notice of a breach of
warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have
discovered a defect in the goods. 99 As previously noted, equine maladies

9 See,

Heather S.

Thomas,

MRI-Aid To Diagnosis In Foot Problems, CAL.

THOROUGHBRED, Dec. 2009, at 67.
96 Miller, supranote

94, at 571.
Catherine Altier, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Barriers to Enforcing a Code of Ethics
for Thoroughbred Auctions in the United States, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 1061, 1067 (2007).
9 Id.
9 See U.C.C. §§ 2-607(3)(a), 2-714(1) (2012). Similarly, a seller must notify the buyer of
revocation of acceptance within a reasonable period of time. See Heller v. Sullivan, 372 N.E.2d 1036,
1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to timely notice of
revocation where a buyer retained a horse and exhibited it in shows for nine months after sale before
complaining about the seller's failure to provide "papers" for the horse).
9
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may lie dormant and may not immediately surface post-sale. As such,
timely notification may be difficult or impossible.
In some cases, buyers successfully proceeded on a breach of
warranty claim, even when time had lapsed between the buyer's discovery
of a horse's defect and notification to the seller. For example, in Nelson v.
Heuckeroth, the court awarded damages for breach of warranty even when
the buyer failed to request radiographs during the veterinary exam at the
time the horse was purchased.100 Three years later, after the horse became
lame, radiographs revealed bone deformities indicating the horse had
developed navicular disease before the sale.'o Even though the court found
radiographs at the time of sale would have revealed the disease, the court
held, as a matter of fact, the navicular disease did not develop post-sale.o 2
Here, a three-year lapse between the sale and notice did not defeat the
buyer's breach of warranty claim.103
Similarly, in Schneider v. Person the court permitted a buyer to
proceed on a theory of breach of warranty where the buyer waited over six
months to notify the seller that the purchased horse had splints at the time
of sale.'" The court indicated the buyer was a non-merchant, a reasonable
time is to be calculated based on the specific facts of the case, and the delay
might be found reasonable in light of the buyer's limited equine
experience. 05 Even though the defect in this case was clearly visible, it may
be that the buyer's inexperience persuaded the court to leniently apply the
U.C.C.'s notice requirements.
In both Nelson and Schneider, the holdings conceded the defects at
issue existed at the time of sale.10 6 Such a conclusion is not always easily
made. A soft-tissue injury can appear almost instantaneously after a horse
has been sold. o0Proving a horse's defect existed at the time of sale, as
opposed to a later-developed defect, can be challenging. For this reason, a
buyer should seek a veterinarian to perform a pre-purchase examination
prior to the buyer's acceptance of the horse.'s

1oo
Nelson v. Heuckeroth, No. 74-2354, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14996, at *58 (S.D.N.Y.

Dec.

1, 1978).
1o1Id at *12.

102

Id. at *16
103
Id. at *44.
104 Schneider v. Person, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 10, 11 (1964). A splint
is a hard body growth that
develops on a horse's leg due to trauma or concussion. Frank Santos, Splints and Splint-Bone Fractures
in Horses, Equisearch, http://www.equisearch.com/horses-ridingtraining/splints-and-splint-bonefractures-horses/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
"osSchneider, 34 Pa, D. & C.2d at 12-13.
106 See Nelson, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14996, at *5-7; see also Schneider at 11.
107Miller, supra note 94,
at 576-77.
'0oSome courts have even held failure to conduct a pre-purchase exam results in the buyer's
waiver of implied warranties. See Ladner v. Jordan, 848 So. 2d 870, 873 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) ("Under
the U.C.C., when a buyer refuses to examine the goods prior to use under circumstances where the
defect complained of would have been revealed through examination, the implied warranty of fitness for
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Courts suggest in certain equine sub-communities, including the
racing industry, such exams are the norm.' 09 In other sub-communities,
however, pre-purchase exams are not routinely performed or would be
impossible to perform. For example, horses are commonly purchased at
auction." 0 More informal auctions provide neither adequate time nor the
facilities for a complete pre-purchase exam."' A buyer at such an auction
may have means to document the horse's veterinary condition prior to sale.
In these cases, a buyer may find himself without a U.C.C. remedy due to
the buyer's inability to prove a defect existed at the time of sale. For
example, in Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., the buyer purchased "Red
Carpet" at auction and failed to conduct a pre-purchase examination."l 2 The
next morning, after the horse presented lameness, the buyer notified the
auction sponsor. 113 Subsequent radiography revealed a broken splint
bone.11 4 The trial court denied the buyer's breach of warranty claim and
held the buyer failed to prove the fracture occurred prior to sale." 5 On
appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding the buyer
should have more thoroughly inspected the horse at the time of auction."' 6
The appellate court affirmed the buyer could not prove any breach of
warranty where the evidence did not indicate the injury was present at the
time of auction.' 7
Similarly, in Gilbert v. Caffee, the court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the buyer's warranty claims where the buyer agreed to
purchase a horse on an installment contract and repeatedly competed on the
horse before notifying the seller of intent to withhold installment payments
because the horse had been misrepresented."8 The court noted the "longer a
buyer keeps and uses [a horse], the greater becomes the likelihood that
some conduct on his part caused or contributed to the defect."" 9 In Gilbert-,
the court concluded the passage of fourteen months between taking

a particular purpose can be deemed waived."). In other circumstances, courts have not penalized a buyer
for delay in performing a veterinary examination. See, e.g., White Devon Farm v. Stahl, 88 Misc. 2d
961, 965-67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (justifying the delay in performance of a breeding soundness
examination on the fact that the stallion was initially racing and the parties both contemplated that the
examination would occur only after the stallion retired from racing).
' Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 1968).
"o Id. at 114.

.. Id.at 115.
2
" Id. at 114-15.
"' Id. at 115.

"4 id.

us Id. at 116.

"6 Id. at 119; cf Chick v. Brimm, No. 01-02-0106, 2002 Del. C.P. LEXIS 44, at *8 (Sept. 30
2002) (finding no obligation to perform radiographs at a "small local horse sale," even if such practice
was common at major annual sales).
"' Miron, 400 F.2d at 119.
" Gilbert v. Caffee, 293 N.W.2d 893, 896 (S.D. 1980).
9
11
Id.
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possession of the horse and communicating that the horse was purportedly
unfit was simply too lengthy of a time period to afford the buyer relief.120
V. CONCLUSION

As these cases illustrate, buyers are well advised to conduct a
thorough examination of a sale horse before the horse leaves the seller's
possession. The more a buyer documents the horse's condition at the time
of the sale, the more likely the buyer will be able to timely notify the seller
and comply with the U.C.C.'s notice requirements if a problem later arises.
Pre-sale issue identification also benefits the seller because she is then less
likely to be blind-sided by issues after the horse has left her custody. All
pre-existing conditions should be noted in the sales contract at the time of
purchase. The buyer should immediately notify the seller, in writing, if the
buyer discovers a condition the buyer believes constitutes a breach of
warranty.
Whether the purchase of a horse is intended as a business
transaction or to add a beloved companion to the household, buyers and
sellers should familiarize themselves with their legal rights and remedies
regarding the purchase. One persistent norm in the equine industry is that
legal advice is often sought only after a dispute arises.121 Too often, horses
are bought and sold without the involvement of attorneys-even six-figure
horses may be sold through informal, handshake deals. 122 Buyers and
sellers benefit from an attorney's early pre-dispute involvement, especially
one well versed in the nuances of the U.C.C. Such an attorney can assist the
parties in crafting a sales contract that works in tandem with the U.C.C.
default rules. Such a well-drafted contract adequately reflects the parties'
agreement and ensures both parties get the full benefit of their bargain.

120
Id. at 895-96.
121 Kathleen J.P. Tabor, Mediation and Arbitration Clauses in
Equine Contracts: The
Importance of Resolving Conflicts While Maintaining Mutually Beneficial Relationships, 22 ENT. &
SPORTS LAW. 18, 18 (2004).
122 Dimario v. Coppola, 10 F. Supp. 2d 213, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(noting the prevalence of
"gentlemen's agreements" in the racing industry).

